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In Bank Security Holdings
By William R. Keeton
W
hile bank security holdings have in-
creased sharply in recent years, there is
widespread disagreement about the sig-
nificance of the increase. Some analysts argue that
the increase is not a cause for concern because it
results from temporary factors such as the busi-
ness cycle. Others argue that the increase repre-
sents a permanent shift in bank portfolio
preferences from loans to securities, which could
cause banks to look more like mutual funds. If the
latter view is true, small firms that rely on banks
for credit may be unable to fund new investment.
Moreover, monetary policy may be less able to
influence total spending in the economy by affect-
ing bank lending.
This article seeks to determine how much of
the surge in bank security holdings can be explained
by temporary factors. The first section discusses
possible explanations for the recent increase in
bank security holdings. The second section presents
empirical evidence based on the aggregate behavior
of bank portfolios over the previous 30 years. The
article concludes that more than half the increase
in security holdings cannot be explained by tempo-
rary factors, suggesting that bank portfolio prefer-
ences may have permanently changed. 
POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE
INCREASE IN BANK SECURITY
HOLDINGS
Is the recent increase in bank security hold-
ings unusually large by historical standards? In
comparing the recent increase with past increases,
it is important to take into account the tendency
for inflation and long-run economic growth to
increase bank security holdings. Over time, the
dollar values of all bank assets and liabilities
should increase with the price level. And as ag-
gregate output grows, so should the size of the
banking system and the real values of all bank
assets and liabilities, including security holdings.
One way of adjusting the change in security
holdings for both inflation and long-run economic
growth is to measure security holdings relative to
potential GDP. Potential GDP is the amount of
output the economy can produce at full employment,
valued in current dollars. Because potential GDP
measures output at full employment, it provides a
better measure of long-run economic growth than
actual GDP, which varies over the business cycle.
And because potential GDP is measured in current
dollars, it increases with the price level.
Adjusted for inflation and long-run economic
growth, the recent increase in total bank security
holdings far exceeds past increases (Chart 1).
1 From
the fourth quarter of 1989 to the second quarter of
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potential GDP increased 2.7 percentage points.
During the previous 30 years, by contrast, the
largest increase in the ratio over a period of 3 1/2
years or less was only 1.9 points. Possible expla-
nations for the recent increase can be grouped into
two categories—temporary and permanent.
2
Temporary explanations
One factor that may have caused a temporary
increase in security holdings is the slowdown in
economic activity and the accompanying fall in
short-term interest rates during the 1990-91 re-
cession. Another factor is that short-term rates
continued falling after the recession ended, in
contrast to previous cycles. A third factor is that
excessive borrowing and lending in the 1980s may
have led to a bigger and more prolonged decrease
in the demand for and supply of bank loans during
this recession than past ones.
3
Normal cyclical response. Bank security
holdings tend to increase during a recession and
early recovery for two reasons. First, banks find
lending to be less attractive during recessions. The
slowdown in economic activity reduces busi-
nesses’ and households’ demand for credit, de-
creasing the interest rates that banks can charge on
loans and, thus, the expected return from lending.
Recessions also increase the risk of default, which
reduces the amount banks are willing to lend even
without any change in the expected return from
lending. These factors tend to reduce the attrac-
tiveness of loans. One way banks may respond is
by shrinking their total size—that is, by cutting
back on loans and reducing large time deposits and
other  borrowed  funds. Another way banks may
respond is by shifting out of loans into securities,
keeping their total assets unchanged.
A second reason bank security holdings may
increase during a recession and early recovery is
that easier monetary policy increases the amount
of funds banks have to invest. The Federal Reserve
usually pushes down short-term interest rates dur-
ing recessions to stimulate the economy. The im-
mediate effect of such a reduction in interest rates
is typically to increase the public’s demand for
core deposits—checkable deposits and small time
and savings deposits. But the decline in interest
rates may not immediately stimulate lending. For
example, loan demand may be unresponsive to the
cost of borrowing in the short run. Or it may take
time for lower open-market rates to increase loan
demand indirectly by stimulating the economy.
Thus, when the Fed eases, banks may enjoy a
temporary surplus of funds. One way banks may
respond is by reducing their large time deposits
and other borrowed funds, which tend to be more
expensive than core deposits. Another way is by
acquiring more securities.
 Chart 1 confirms that it is normal for bank
security holdings to increase during recession and
early recovery. The typical pattern is for the ratio
of bank security holdings to potential GDP to start
declining sometime before the business cycle
peak, turn upward sometime before the business
cycle trough, and then continue increasing for a
while. The most recent increase in the security
ratio started a little earlier and has been signifi-
cantly larger than in the last five recessions. How-
ever, the increase in the security ratio may have
been larger this time because the recession and
recovery themselves were different. Thus, from
Chart 1 alone, it is impossible to tell whether the
recent increase in security holdings is a normal
cyclical response.
Unusual behavior of short-term rates during
the recovery. In past recessions and recoveries, the
Fed stopped easing by the time the recession
ended (Chart 2). Thus, during recoveries, short-
term rates remained stable or increased. During
the most recent recovery, in contrast, short-term
rates continued falling until late 1992—a year and
a half after the recession technically ended. Be-
cause decreases in short-term rates tend to raise
the public’s demand for deposits faster than bor-
rowers’ demand for loans, the continued fall in
46 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYshort-term rates during this recovery may have
caused banks to temporarily increase their secu-
rity holdings.
4
Unusual temporary decline in loan demand
and supply. As noted above, recessions decrease
the attractiveness of lending by reducing the inter-
est  rates borrowers are willing to pay and the
amount of default risk banks are willing to assume.
This effect suggests bank loans should decline
relative to potential GDP during recessions. Chart
3 confirms this fact; as a percent of potential GDP,
bank loans typically peak near the start of the
recession and then decline for a while before re-
suming their increase. The chart also shows, how-
ever, that bank loans have fallen much more
sharply during the recent recession and recovery
than in the 1970, 1980, and 1981-82 recessions
and recoveries. Loans also have fallen more than
in the 1973-75 recession and recovery, though the
difference is smaller.
Two explanations have been offered for the
unusually steep decline in bank loans during the
recent recession and recovery (Bernanke and Lown;
Cantor and Wenninger; Johnson). The first is a
temporary decrease in the demand for loans by
borrowers. According to this explanation, busi-
nesses and households have been especially reluc-
tant to borrow because they overborrowed in the
1980s and want to restructure their balance sheets.
The second explanation is a temporary decrease in
the supply of loans by banks. According to this
explanation, banks have been more reluctant to take
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ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1994 47on default risk than in past recessions, either be-
cause their heavy loan losses during the late 1980s
made them more risk-averse or because regulators
put unusual pressure on them to avoid risk.
Whether the unusual weakness in lending re-
sults from reduced demand or reduced supply,
banks can be expected to respond either by cut-
ting back on their large time deposits and other
borrowings or by increasing their security hold-
ings. A good case can also be made that the effect
on bank portfolios should be temporary. Once bor-
rowers finish restructuring their balance sheets, the
demand for bank loans will presumably revive. And
as the memory of the 1980s fades and the economy
fully recovers, banks and their regulators could
become less risk averse.
Permanent explanations
Two factors may have led to a permanent
increase in bank security holdings—the adoption
of risk-based capital standards, and increased pes-
simism about the long-term prospects for bank
lending.
Risk-based capital standards. New capital
standards announced in 1989 may have made se-
curities more attractive to banks. Under the new
system, banks must satisfy a minimum ratio of
capital to risk-adjusted assets. Business and con-
sumer loans have a weight of 100 percent in risk-
adjusted assets, while most securities carry
weights of zero or 20 percent.
5 Because increases
in securities have little or no effect on risk-adjusted
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48 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYassets, a bank can use deposits or other borrowed
funds to purchase securities without having to
raise a large amount of capital to satisfy the risk-
based requirement. And because decreases in
loans have a one-for-one effect on risk-adjusted
assets, a bank can reduce its required capital
without shrinking total assets by shifting to secu-
rities from loans.
6 
Economists disagree on the plausibility of this
explanation for the recent increase in bank secu-
rity holdings. Skeptics argue that most banks were
unaffected by the risk-based requirement because
they already exceeded it by a substantial margin.
They also point out that credit unions, which were
not subject to risk-based capital requirements, also
shifted heavily into securities (Greenspan; Mullins).
And they cite studies showing that banks exceed-
ing the risk-based capital requirement increased
their security holdings just as much as banks that
did not (Baer and McElravey; Berger and Udell;
Hancock and Wilcox). Proponents of the risk-
based capital explanation concede that relatively
few banks were affected by the risk-based require-
ment. However, they counter that these banks
were primarily large banks and thus accounted for
a disproportionate share of industry assets. And
they cite other research suggesting that banks ex-
ceeding the risk-based capital requirement increased
their security holdings less than banks that did not
(Haubrich and Wachtel; Jacklin).
Pessimism about the long-run profitability of
lending. A final possibility is that banks have
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ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1994 49undergone a permanent shift in portfolio prefer-
ences unrelated to recent changes in capital re-
quirements. As a result of increasing competition
from securities markets and nonbank lenders,
banks may have decided they can earn adequate
profits from lending only by focusing on their best
customers and making fewer loans. To be sure, the
competitive position of banks has eroded gradu-
ally over many years, making it unclear why they
would suddenly decide to shift out of loans. But
perhaps the heavy loan losses of the late 1980s
delivered the coup de grace, convincing banks
once and for all that lending was less profitable.
One way banks might respond is by shifting into
securities.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
To the extent that temporary factors fail to
account for the recent increase in bank security
holdings, it can be argued that banks may have
made a long-term decision to withdraw from tra-
ditional forms of lending and operate more like
mutual funds. To determine whether the increase
in bank security holdings is temporary or perma-
nent, this section uses regression analysis to esti-
mate how much of the increase can be attributed
to the three temporary factors cited above—nor-
mal cyclical response, the unusual fall in short-
term interest rates, and the unusual decline in loan
demand and loan supply.
7 
All the empirical results are based on a vector
autoregression (VAR) estimated with quarterly data
on the aggregate economy and bank balance
sheets. In a VAR, each variable is regressed on its
own lags and the lags of each other variable in the
model. Such an approach has two major advantages.
First, it allows for feedback among the variables.
And second, because all variables are included in
each regression equation, fewer arbitrary decisions
are made as to the structure of the model.
8 
The VAR includes four lags of three macroe-
conomic variables and four balance sheet variables,
and is estimated in levels.
9 The macro variables
are the federal funds rate, the ratio of actual GDP
to potential GDP, and the rate of inflation as mea-
sured by the GDP deflator. The funds rate and GDP
ratio are included to capture the first two tempo-
rary explanations for the increase in security hold-
ings—normal cyclical response and the unusual
behavior of short-term rates. Although no one has
suggested that the recent increase in bank security
holdings is due to the behavior of inflation, this
variable is included because of its potential effects
on bank portfolio decisions and because of its
important influence on monetary policy decisions.
The bank balance sheet variables are securi-
ties, loans, core deposits (checkable deposits plus
small time and savings deposits), and large time
deposits.
10 Loans are included in the VAR to cap-
ture the effect on bank security holdings of the
lending slowdown. Core deposits and large time
deposits are included because banks may respond
to a shortfall in loans by reducing deposits rather
than increasing securities.
11 All four variables are
seasonally adjusted and measured as ratios to po-
tential GDP. Also, a dummy variable is included
after 1982 to account for the impact of deposit
deregulation on core deposits.
12 
The model is estimated over the 1960-89 pe-
riod. The estimation starts in 1960 partly because
of data availability and partly because large nego-
tiable CDs, which are an important alternative to
securities for funding loans, were not introduced
until 1961. The estimation ends in 1989 because
that was the year when securities and loans both
started to deviate significantly from previous
trends.
The VAR yields three forms of evidence on
the causes of the recent increase in security holdings.
First are the “impulse responses” for the 1960-89
period. These responses indicate the typical effect
on bank security holdings of various shocks—for
example, unexpected changes in GDP, interest
rates, or loans. Second is the “decomposition of
variance” for the 1960-89 period. This decompo-
sition indicates how much of the past variation in
50 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYbank security holdings was due to each possible
kind of shock. Third, and most important, is the
“decomposition of change” for the 1989-93 pe-
riod. This decomposition estimates how much of
the recent increase in security holdings is due to
each kind of shock, assuming banks respond to
such shocks the same way as in 1960-89.
13
Impulse responses for 1960-89
Based on past behavior, how plausible are the
business cycle, the behavior of short-term interest
rates, and the slowdown in lending as explanations
for the recent increase in security holdings? As a
first step in answering this question, Chart 4 shows
how the ratio of bank security holdings to potential
GDP typically responds to three different
shocks—an unexpected decline in the ratio of
actual GDP to potential GDP, an unexpected de-
cline in the federal funds rate, and an unexpected
decline in the ratio of total loans to potential GDP.
In each case, the change in the variable is unex-
pected in the sense that it cannot be predicted from
the VAR. And in each case, the change is equal in
magnitude to the typical unexpected change
over the 1960-89 period.
14
Chart 4 shows that bank security holdings
increase in response to all three shocks. In all three
cases, the ratio of security holdings to potential
GDP reaches a maximum after about a year and
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ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1994 51for the 1960-89 period suggest that negative
shocks to GDP, the funds rate, and lending may
account for at least some of the increase in security
holdings since 1989. The extent to which the three
shocks explain the recent increase depends, how-
ever, on how big the shocks have been relative to
the change in security holdings, something the
impulse responses cannot reveal.
Variance decomposition for 1960-89  
Table 1 takes the analysis a step further by
showing the extent to which various kinds of
shocks explain changes in bank security holdings
during the 1960-89 period. This information is
relevant because the more a particular kind of
shock helps explain past changes in bank security
holdings, the more plausible it is that the same
kind of shock can explain the recent change.
Table 1 shows how much of the unexpected
variation in the security ratio over a period of 3
1/2 years tended to be due to various shocks. A
horizon of 3 1/2 years is used because the purpose
of this article is to explain the change in security
holdings from the end of 1989 to mid-1993. Each
row in the table corresponds to a different variable
and shows the percentage of variation in the secu-
rity ratio due to that variable. For example, the
first row shows that over a 3 1/2-year period, 10
percent of the variation of the security ratio from
the level expected at the beginning of the period
tended to be due to unexpected changes in the
funds rate.
The table shows that shocks to the three
macroeconomic variables and to loans account for
much of the past variation in the security ratio.
After 3 1/2 years, shocks to these four variables
tend to explain 80 percent of the variation in the
security ratio from the level initially expected (10
+ 19 + 27 + 24). Thus, based on past behavior, it
seems plausible that the business cycle, the post-
recession drop in the funds rate, and the slowdown
in lending could account for most of the increase
in the security ratio from 1989 to 1993. 
Like the impulse response functions, the vari-
ance decomposition is suggestive but cannot
prove which shocks account for the recent in-
crease in bank security holdings. For example, the
variation in bank security holdings due to shocks
in the three macroeconomic variables and shocks
in loans might have been high over the 1960-89
period only because the shocks themselves were
very large. From Table 1, there is no way to tell
whether shocks to these variables have also been
large enough in the recent period to explain most of
the change in security holdings.
15
Decomposition of change for 1989-93
To better assess the causes of the recent in-
crease in security holdings, Table 2 uses the VAR
to attribute the actual change in the security ratio
from 1989:Q4 to 1993:Q2 to various shocks.
16 The
Table 1
Variance Decomposition for Ratio
of Securities to Potential GDP
1960-89
Percent of variance over 3 1/2 years 
due to shocks in




Core deposits   2 
Large time deposits   5 
Securities  13 
Total 100 
52 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYfirst row shows the actual change in the ratio of
securities to potential GDP over the period. The
second row shows the expected change in the
security ratio—the change that could have been
anticipated given conditions at the start of the
period and underlying trends. The actual change
minus the expected change equals the unexpected
change. As the third row shows, the unexpected
change in the security ratio was 2.8 percentage
points. The next seven rows of the table show how
much of this 2.8 percentage point increase was due to
shocks in each of the seven variables in the VAR.
17
According to the table, shocks to the three
macroeconomic variables and to loans explain a
significant part of the recent increase in bank
security holdings. Shocks to the funds rate, GDP,
and inflation accounted for a total of 0.9 percent-
age points of the increase in the security ratio from
1989:Q4 to 1993:Q2 (0.6 + 1.1 - 0.8). And the
unusually steep drop in loans—whether due to
reduced demand or reduced supply—contributed
another 0.9 points to the increase in bank security
holdings.  
Although macroeconomic shocks and loan
shocks explain much of the increase in the security
ratio, the rest of the table shows that more than half
the increase remains unexplained. Sharper-than-
expected declines in core deposits and large time
deposits should have reduced the security ratio by
a total of 0.5 points (0.2 + 0.3). Thus, the unex-
plained increase in the security ratio—the portion
due to shocks to securities rather than to shocks to
other variables—amounts to 1.5 percentage points
(2.8 - 0.9 - 0.9 + 0.5). Put another way, shocks to
securities account for 53 percent of the total unex-
pected increase in the security ratio over the 3 1/2
years from the end of 1989 to mid-1993 (1.5/2.8).
During the 1960-89 period, by contrast, shocks to
securities accounted for only 13 percent of the
unexpected variation in the security ratio over a 3
1/2-year horizon (Table 1).
Chart 5 shows that the unexplained change in
the security ratio did not emerge until the second
quarter of 1992, a year after the recession ended.
The solid line in the chart shows the unexpected
change in the security ratio from 1989:Q4. The
dotted line shows the portion of the change that
can be explained by shocks to other variables.
From Chart 5, it can be seen that the security ratio
increased significantly more than expected from
1989:Q4 to 1992:Q1—1.5 percentage points. The
chart shows, however, that all the unexpected in-
crease in the ratio up to that point can be explained
by shocks to other variables.
18 After 1992:Q1, the
security ratio continues increasing more than
expected, but the change due to shocks to other
variables levels off, causing the gap between the
two curves to grow.
19
These findings suggest that about a year into
the recovery, securities became unusually attrac-
tive to banks. One possibility suggested earlier is
that banks experienced a permanent shift in
Table 2
Decomposition of Change in Ratio 
of Securities to Potential GDP
Percentage point change, 1989:Q4 to 1993:Q2
Actual change   2.7 
– Expected change   -.1 
= Unexpected change   2.8 
Change due to shocks in
Funds  rate   .6 
GDP  1.1 
Inflation  -.8 
Loans   .9 
Core deposits   -.2 
Large time deposits   -.3 
Securities  1.5 
Total  2.8 
ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1994 53preferences from loans to securities—for exam-
ple, due to risk-based capital requirements or in-
creased pessimism about the long-run prospects
for lending.
20 Another possibility is that banks
began to respond differently to temporary declines
in GDP, the funds rate, and loans. For example, as
loans continued to decline during the recovery,
banks may have decided to use more of their
surplus funds than normal to buy securities, in-
tending to sell the securities when loans finally
revived.
CONCLUSIONS
Based on the behavior of bank portfolios over
the previous 30 years, the recent increase in bank
security holdings appears highly unusual. To be
sure, the business cycle, the post-recession drop in
interest rates, and the unusual decrease in loan
demand and loan supply explain a substantial part
of the recent increase in security holdings. But a
little more than half the total increase in the ratio
of bank security holdings to potential GDP from
1989 to 1993 remains unexplained. The possibility
cannot be dismissed that the unexplained increase
in the security ratio reflects a change in banks’
response to temporary shocks in GDP, interest
rates, and loans. If so, security holdings may go
back down as the recovery progresses. On the
other hand, the unexplained increase in the secu-
rity ratio may well reflect a permanent shift in
bank portfolio preferences from loans to securi-
ties. If so, security holdings will remain high,
causing banks to look more like mutual funds and
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1 Data in this article include all government and private
securities held by domestically chartered commercial banks
and U.S. offices of foreign banks. At the end of 1989, U.S.
Treasury securities accounted for 27 percent of total bank
security holdings; federally guaranteed mortgage-backed
securities accounted for 21 percent; other U.S. Government
securities for 17 percent; state and local securities for 22
percent; and private securities for 14 percent.
2 For other discussions of the possible causes of the increase
in bank security holdings, see Greenspan; Mullins; Neuber-
ger; Rodrigues.
3 Another temporary explanation suggested by some ana-
lysts is that an unusually steep yield curve encouraged banks
to shift from short-term loans to long-term government
bonds (Rodrigues).  However, when a measure of the steep-
ness of the yield curve is included in the empirical model in
the next section, the variable explains none of the recent
increase in bank security holdings.  This result should not be
surprising. To the extent the steep yield curve reflected
market expectations of higher short-term interest rates in the
future, banks would have little to gain from shifting from
short-term investments to long-term investments.  They
would earn higher profits in the short run, while short-term
interest rates were low, but lower profits in the long term,
when short-term interest rates were high. The only reasons
a bank might make such a shift are because it believed it
could outguess the market or because it wanted to gamble. 
4 For evidence that an unexpected change in short-term rates
causes a change of opposite sign in bank security holdings,
see Bernanke and Blinder. 
5 The weight is zero for U.S. Treasury securities and mort-
gage-backed securities directly guaranteed by the Govern-
ment National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae); 20
percent for general obligation municipal bonds and mort-
gage-backed securities guaranteed by the Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) or the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac); and 50 percent
for municipal revenue bonds and privately issued mortgage-
backed securities.
6 Banks must also satisfy a leverage requirement in the form
of a minimum ratio of capital to total assets (Keeton).  The
new capital standards increase the attractiveness of securi-
ties only for banks that exceed the leverage requirement but
not the risk-based requirement.
7 The assumption here is that borrowers’ decreased willing-
ness to borrow and banks’ decreased willingness to take on
default risk are temporary changes due to the excesses of the
1980s.  If this assumption is false, that portion of the increase
in security holdings due to the lending slowdown may also
reflect a fundamental change in bank behavior. 
8 As is well known, such decisions cannot be avoided
altogether. To calculate the impulse responses, variance de-
composition, and decomposition of change, certain assump-
tions must be made about the contemporaneous correlations
of the variables (the “ordering” assumptions).
9 In time series jargon, all seven variables appear to be
integrated of order one over the sample period. A common
approach in such circumstances is to estimate the model in
first differences rather than levels. However, the Johansen
test strongly suggests the existence of a cointegrating
vector, implying that it would be inappropriate to differ-
ence the data.
10 The data were obtained from the Board of Governors and
correspond to Table 1.24 in the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
11 Because bank assets and liabilities must sum to zero, the
VAR also has implications for the residual item consisting
of other liabilities minus other assets. Other liabilities in-
clude RPs, federal funds borrowed from nonbanks, and
Eurodollar borrowing, while other assets include cash. 
12 Although the deregulation of core deposits began in 1978
with the introduction of the 6-month money market certifi-
cate, the biggest step by far was the introduction of MMDAs
at the beginning of 1983. From the data, this event appears
to have led to a permanent increase in core deposits.
13 One limitation of the VAR is that it assumes an increase
in any variable has the same size effect as a decrease in that
variable—for example, declines in GDP during a recession
have the same effect on bank balance sheets as increases in
GDP during a boom.
14 In particular, the shock to each variable is one standard
deviation in size. To compute impulse response functions,
some choice must also be made as to the ordering of the
variables. The earlier a variable comes in the ordering, the
more exogenous the variable is assumed to be. Specifically,
shocks to a particular variable are allowed to cause contem-
poraneous changes in those variables that come later in the
ordering but not in those variables that come earlier. In the
present case, the variables are ordered as follows: the funds
rate, GDP, inflation, loans, core deposits, securities, and
large time deposits. The funds rate is put first because it is a
policy instrument which appears to respond only with a lag
ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1994 55to economic conditions (Bernanke and Blinder). Loans and
core deposits are put before securities and large time depos-
its on the grounds that banks use securities and large time
deposits as buffers against changes in loans and core depos-
its. Although this particular ordering seemed the most plau-
sible, the results are not significantly affected when different
orderings are used.
15 It should also be noted that the recent increase in the
security ratio is much larger than the typical unexpected
change over the 1960-89 period. The security ratio increased
2.7 percentage points from the end of 1989 to mid-1993.  For
the 1960-89 period, by contrast, the standard deviation of
unexpected changes in the security ratio over a 3 1/2-year
horizon was only 0.7 percentage point. Thus, to account for
the same percent of the recent change in the security ratio as of
past changes, shocks to the three macroeconomic variables and
loans would have to be larger than average.
16 This decomposition involves two steps. The first step is
to estimate the actual shocks to each variable over the period
from the end of 1989 to mid-1993. The second step is to use
the impulse response functions to determine the effects of
each set of shocks on the security ratio. 
17 Table 2 shows the effect on securities of shocks to other
variables but does not show the sign or magnitude of those
shocks. One way of summarizing this information is to
calculate the cumulative change in each other variable due
to shocks to that variable. This “own effect” equals -4.5 percen-
tage points for the funds rate, -2.8 points for GDP, 2.6 points
for inflation, -4.5 points for loans, -1.1 points for core deposits,
and -0.4 point for large time deposits. These figures confirm
that the funds rate, GDP, and loans were all subject to large
negative shocks after 1989. They also indicate that the
inflation rate was subject to positive shocks (inflation should
have declined even more than it did), while core deposits and
large time deposits were subject to negative shocks.
18 Although not shown in the chart, macroeconomic shocks
contributed 1.0 percentage point to the increase in the secu-
rity ratio up to 1992:Q1, and loan shocks contributed another
0.5 point.
19 A two-standard-error confidence band was computed
around the unexplained change in the security ratio—the gap
between the two curves in Chart 5—using the Monte Carlo
technique in the RATS software package (Doan). This con-
fidence band lies entirely above zero after 1992:Q3.
20 It is not obvious why banks would wait until 1992 to
become more pessimistic about long-run lending prospects.
However, one reason banks might have waited this long to
respond to the new risk-based capital requirements is that
FDICIA, the banking law passed in November 1991, tended
to make the requirements more binding (Baer and McEl-
ravey). The law did this by forcing banks to exceed capital
requirements by a wide margin to receive the most favorable
regulatory treatment.
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